New Hampshire Family Law Blog : New Hampshire Divorce Lawyer & Attorney : Crusco Law Firm : Family Law, Custody, Child Support : Manchester, New Hampshire, Massachusetts

In the last session of 2009, the New Hampshire Supreme Court issued its opinion In the Matter of Michele Sukerman and William Sukerman, in which the court held that accidental disability pension benefits are subject to equitable distribution in divorce proceedings. Court litigants should keep in mind that this case does not govern how accidental disability benefits or other marital assets will be divided, but rather holds that any property not excluded by law is thrown into “the pot.” How it will be divided is subject to the specific facts and circumstances of each case, and the factors set forth in RSA 458:16-a

William Sukerman was an employee at the Massachusetts Port Authority (MassPort) Fire and Rescue in Boston from 1991 until a heart attack forced him into retirement in 2008. Upon retirement William began receiving a pension under the Massachusetts retirement system which consisted of an ordinary pension benefit, an annuity and an accidental disability pension benefit. The final divorce decree of the Derry Family Division awarded Michele one-half of the William’s entire “pension plan which accrued between the date of the marriage . . . and the date of the filing of the petition for divorce.”

William argued on appeal that the accidental disability benefit should not have been included in the marital property distribution because it was compensation for lost earning capacity as well as pain and suffering. The court disagreed, and took a “mechanistic approach,” under which all property acquired during the marriage “without regard to title, or to when or how acquired is deemed to be marital property unless it is specifically excepted by statute.” There is no such exception for accidental disability pension benefits in RSA 458:16-a.

The court concluded that this so-called mechanistic approach “best comports with New Hampshire’s equitable distribution law,” under RSA 458:16-a, which provides that “all tangible and intangible property and assets, real or personal, belonging to either or both parties, whether title is held in the name of either or both parties” is subject to equitable distribution. Consequently, the Sukerman case stands for the proposition that so long as there is no specific statutory authority excepting accidental disability benefits from property settlement, such benefits, being acquired during marriage, are marital property and therefore subject to distribution.

Crusco Law Office, PLLC law clerk Daniel McLaughlin contributed to this post.

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The New Hampshire Supreme Court issued an opinion on December 4, 2009 in the case of In the Matter of Adam Muchmore and Amy Jaycox, a domestic relations case pertaining to the modification of a parenting plan. In Muchmore & Jaycox, the Court holds that a parenting plan cannot be modified solely based on the best interests of the child, and instead the modification must comport with the statutory scheme laid out in RSA 461-A:11. The decision is disappointing, though not unexpected since the Court simply strictly applied the statute, because it prevents parents from modifying a parenting plan for issues such as a new schedule for the transition into kindergarten. Based on this decision, it will be important for the legislature to take action to allow modifications to a parenting schedule that do not rise to the level of the factors enumerated in the statute.

As background, Adam Muchmore and Amy Jaycox are parents of a minor child born in 2006. They previously resided in Vermont but have each since moved to New Hampshire. A June 2007 Vermont Order granted Amy Lecroix “primary legal and physical parental rights and responsibilities” for the child and allowed the petitioner, Adam Muchmore, regular weekly contact with the child.

In July 2008, Muchmore petitioned the Lebanon Family Division to modify the parenting plan pursuant to RSA 461-A:11, claiming that (1) Jaycox had “repeatedly, intentionally, and without justification” interfered with his parental responsibilities for the child and modification would be in the child’s best interests; (2) that there was clear and convincing evidence that the child’s present environment was harmful to her; and (3) because of the respondent’s conduct, the original allocation of parental rights and responsibilities was not working.

The Lebanon Family Division ruled that Muchmore had failed to meet his burden of proof with regard to each of the reasons for modification he cited, pursuant to 461-A:11; I(b), I(c), and I(d). The court went on to hold, however, that Muchmore’s petition was “sufficient to establish that modifying the parties’ parenting schedule would be in the child’s best interests, and that, pursuant to RSA 461-A:4 (Supp. 2008), proof that modification was in the child’s best interests was all that was required.” Jacox appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court acknowledged that the circumstances under which a parent may seek modification of an existing parenting plans is governed by RSA 461-A:11, and concluded that because Muchmore did not meet his burden under that statute that he is not entitled to a modification. Muchmore argued that even if he failed to meet his burden under 461-A:11, a parent should be allowed to modify a parenting plan when the modification is in the best interests of the child, citing 461-A:4 as support for his assertion. The court held that even though 461-A:4 referenced a “proceeding to establish or modify”, that statute was aimed at the initial construction of a parenting plan while 461-A:11 governed actual modifications. 

The Court recognized in its opinion that this result was somewhat regrettable in that it prevented a court from “reassessing the best interests of a child in circumstances where the parents are not interfering and where the child’s current environment is not detrimental,” those circumstances being the majority of cases in practice. However, the Court continues, “RSA 461-A:11, I, does not grant the court discretion to modify an existing plan under any other circumstances” and that it is not up to the court to solve that problem or “to speculate as to how the legislature might choose to do so.” (Emphasis added). Simply put, the court is saying that if the legislature wanted to include a provision for the best interests of the child in 461-A:11 it could have chosen to do so. The Court, in the end, relies on strict statutory interpretation and deference to the public policy decisions of the legislature to assert that their hands were effectively tied.

However, without a provision to allow for some limited modifications based on best interests, a parenting plan that addresses the needs of a toddler may have to do for a tween. The parenting plan form itself encourages parents to view the plan as a work in progress as the children grow and their needs change from infant to teen, but the statute itself does not allow for the changes except in the case that the parents agree or major issues develop as set forth in 461-A:11. It is certainly understandable that the legislature would not include a best interests standard for change in major categories such a primary residential responsibility, as this would just encourage more litigation and allow parents to petition the court for modification whenever they might have the upper hand. However, for routine and holiday schedule changes or other issues that do not call for a change in residential responsibility, there needs to be a mechanism to allow for modification based on best interests so that the court may tweak a parenting plan as the current needs of the child dictate.  

 Crusco Law Office, PLLC  Law Clerk Daniel McLaughlin contributed to this post.

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“Surely there can be few loses more grievous than the abrogation of parental rights.” Those words are as true today as they were when Supreme Court Justice Blackmun first wrote them in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services in 1981. Unfortunately, there are times, however grievous, when it is necessary to terminate parental rights against a parents wishes. There are also times when rigorous defense against a petition to terminate parental rights is warranted.

The United States Supreme Court has long recognized the right and the heavy responsibility of the states to terminate the parent-child relationship when there is cause to do so. In New Hampshire, RSA 170-C provides for involuntary termination of parental rights, and the probate courts, and now also the family divisions, have exclusive jurisdiction over such termination of parental rights matters. If the court orders a termination of parental rights, the effect is to sever all legal rights, privileges and duties between the parent and the child. The two become legal strangers in the eyes of the law, with neither parent or child owing any obligations to the other at any point in the future.

A termination petition may be filed, pursuant to RSA 170-C:4 by:

a.       Either parent;

b.      The child’s guardian or legal custodian;

c.       The child’s foster parent if the child has resided with that foster parent continuously for 24 months; or

d.      An “authorized agency,” which in termination of parental rights petitions would be the Division for Children, Youth and Families, or DCYF.

Additionally, the statute sets forth limited conditions on which such a petition may be brought. RSA 170-C:5 lists six circumstances under which a petition for termination of parental rights will be granted:

a.       The parents have abandoned the child

b.      The parents have substantially and continuously neglected to provide the child with the care necessary for mental, emotional, or physical health when they are financially able to do so

c.       The parent(s) have failed to correct conditions that lead to a violation of the Child Protection Act, within twelve months of such a finding

d.      The parent is, and will continue to be, mentally incapable, either by deficiency or illness, of caring for the child

e.       The parent knowingly or willingly caused, or allowed to be caused, severe sexual, physical, emotional or mental abuse of the child

f.       The parent has been convicted of any of the following crimes:

a.       The murder of another child of the parent, a sibling or step-sibling of the child, or the child's other parent;

b.      The manslaughter of another child of the parent, a sibling or step-sibling of the child, the child's other parent;

c.       Attempted murder of the child, step-child, sibling or other parent; or

d.      A felony assault which resulted in injury to the child, a sibling or step-sibling of the child, or the child's other parent.

Courts will consider the best interest of the child in rendering a decision, sometimes appointing a Guardian Ad Litem to represent that interest. However, even if the court determines that the child’s best interests are served by terminating a parent’s rights, that finding alone is not sufficient to order termination. A court must make an explicit finding under the statute that one or more of the above criteria has been satisfied. The United States Supreme Court states: in Santosky v. Kramer:

The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child is protected by the 14th Amendment, and does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.

The Santosky court also held that, except for clear cases of abuse, the government should not separate children from their families or countermand parental authority.

Because termination affects a fundamental constitutional right for parents to raise their children as they see fit, New Hampshire courts have increased the burden on the petitioner to prove that TPR is appropriate. In State v. Robert H., the New Hampshire Supreme Court made it clear that for the termination of parental rights, the standard to be imposed is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that 170-C:5 has been satisfied. It is fitting that the petitioner must meet this highest burden as “the rights of parents (over the family) are held to be natural, essential and inherent rights, within the meaning of the New Hampshire Constitution,” the New Hampshire Supreme Court states. “The permanent termination of the rights of parents over their children is even more final than involuntary commitment or delinquency proceedings” both of which require that heightened standard; no other standard would be appropriate.  

The above discussion merely scratches the surface of these intricate and complicated issues. Each case has its own set of unique facts and circumstances. The termination of parental rights is extremely serious, and for that reason, as well as those cited above, it is very important that you retain competent counsel if you are involved in a TPR action, whether as the parent or the petitioner. Contact Crusco Law Office, PLLC for further information. 

Crusco Law Office, PLLC law clerk, Daniel McLaughlin, contributed to this post.

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On July 1, 2009, the New Hampshire Supreme Court issued an order increasing the filing fees in all cases. The filing fee for a divorce without children is now $205, and a divorce with children or a parenting petition is now $207.

According the the media advisory posted by the court, the fee increase was necessary to continue to fund the services provided by the judicial branch.

Chief Justice John T. Broderick Jr. said the court's decision to change the fees came after state lawmakers asked each branch of state government to find ways to increase state revenue during a severe economic downturn. The Judicial Branch had suggested generating more revenue through fee changes during recent budget negotiations with House and Senate members.

“We have agreed to keep almost 60 staff positions open during the next biennium and will manage with reductions in our operations to meet the new biennial budget,” Chief Justice Broderick said. “In order to keep the system functioning and avoid even further reductions, we felt we had to ask court users to shoulder some of the economic strain on our state during this very difficult time, " the Chief Justice said. "We view our decision as a necessary step we had to take to assist the state in meeting its budget.These are unprecedented economic times,” he added.

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With the same-sex marriage bill about to come to Governor Lynch’s desk, it is an appropriate time to examine the future of fault grounds in New Hampshire. Currently, New Hampshire has both fault and no-fault grounds for divorce. Only about 1% of divorces in New Hampshire are granted on the basis of fault. Of the nine fault grounds, adultery is the most common.

Adultery in New Hampshire has a very narrow definition. For the purposes of the fault ground statute, under the Blanchflower decision,

“the term “adultery” excludes all non-coital sex acts, whether between persons of the same or opposite gender. The only distinction is that person of the same gender cannot, by definition, engage in the one act that constitutes adultery under the state.”

Furthermore, the court rejected the notion that it should expand the definition of adultery to include sexual acts other than intercourse between a man and a woman because doing so would revise the established definition of adultery beyond recognition, and “it is not the function of the judiciary to provide for present needs by an extension of past legislation.”

I was before a marital master on a temporary hearing the other day, and when the issue of fault grounds came up, he pointed out that if same-sex marriage becomes law, there will be married same-sex couples who, by virtue of their sexuality, cannot commit adultery according to the law (unless they were to cheat with an opposite-sex partner). It is an interesting predicament, and something that the legislature will need to address. The legislature will need to either revise the definition of adultery to include an expanded array of sexual acts between same-sex or opposite-sex couples, or abolish fault grounds all together. Many family law attorneys would argue for the later, pointing out that fault ground divorces cost more, take longer and interfere with parents moving forward with a good co-parenting relationship. Either way, it is time for the legislature to take action on the issue.

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Once a child support order has been approved by the court the modification statute, NH RSA 458- C:7, allows for a petition to modify the child support order after three (3) years have passed. If one party petitions for a modification before the three year mark they must show a substantial change in circumstances that makes continuing the original order improper and unfair.

The NH supreme court released an opinion on In the Matter of Lynn and Lynn on April 24, 2009 which deals with the substantial change in circumstances standard. In this case, when the Mother and Father got divorced, two children began residing with Father and one child with Mother. Mother became obligated to pay child support at a rate that deviated from the guidelines due to her limited income. Less than 3 years later, Mother petitioned to modify her child support obligation because she had been accepted to nursing school and was going to have to work part-time. The court granted the modification and ceased all obligations to pay child support.

The trial court specifically found that the Mother’s income while in school was a substantial change in circumstances and that even though the Mother is voluntarily underemployed it is only one factor to consider whether or not modification is warranted.

The Father appealed the decision to discontinue child support. The Father argued that by choosing to go to nursing school the Mother was voluntarily underemployed and therefore she should still be required to pay the child support. The NH Supreme Court held that the trial court followed the statute and therefore the trial court did not err in modifying the child support.

However, the court warned that this particular case is not meant to imply that a parent is entitled to reduced child support obligation whenever the parent has voluntarily reduced his/her income to attend school. The court mused that there could be circumstances when a parent goes back to school voluntarily and even with decreased income they must still pay the initial child support amount.

Marisa L. Ulloa, Crusco Law Office, PLLC Law Clerk, contributed to this post.

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Q: I have primary residential responsibility for my children, and I want to move out of state with them, what do I need to do to move?

A: The relocation statute (NH RSA 461-A:12) requires that the relocating parent shall provide reasonable notice to the other parent of the move. While “reasonable notice” may vary depending on special factors present in your case, in most cases 60 days is presumed reasonable notice. This notice requirement applies in all parenting rights and responsibilities cases unless specifically addressed otherwise in the parties’ existing order or agreement. However, it does not apply when the relocation will move the parent and children closer to the other parent or within the same school district.

If the non-relocating parent objects, the court will hold a hearing on the matter at the request of either parent. Often, the court will appoint a guardian ad litem to investigate the issues and make a recommendation to the court regarding the relocation.

In order for the relocating parent’s request to be approved, that parent must show that their relocation is for a legitimate purpose and that the proposed relocation is reasonable in light of that purpose. In other words, if the relocating parent is moving to be near her family that lives in Florida, the proposed move should be to Florida and not North Dakota. A legitimate purpose may be for a variety of different reasons, including economic opportunities such as employment or the ability to be self-supportive, to be close to a support network of friends and family, or for an educational opportunity for the parent or children.

If the relocating parent proves, by a preponderance of the evidence (more probable than not), that the relocation is for a legitimate purpose, then the burden shifts to the non-relocating parent who must show the court that the proposed relocating is not in the best interests of the children. Even if the relocating parent has a legitimate purpose, and is not moving for nefarious purposes such as interfering in the other parent’s relationship with the children, the court may find that it is not in the children’s best interests and deny to relocation.

When considering the relocation, the court may consider several factors enumerated in the NH Supreme Court cases Tomasko and Pfeuffer:

·         Each parent’s reasons for seeking or opposing the move;

·         The quality of the relationships between the child and the custodial and noncustodial parents;

·         The impact of the move on the quantity and quality of the child's future contact with the noncustodial parent;

·         The degree to which the custodial parent’s and child’s life may be enhanced economically, emotionally, and educationally by the move;

·         The feasibility of preserving the relationship between the noncustodial parent and child through suitable visitation arrangements;

·         Any negative impact from continued or exacerbated hostility between the custodial and noncustodial parents; and

·         The effect that the move may have on any extended family relations.

No single factor is presumed to be dispositive, and the court may consider additional factors as the case demands.

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The New Hampshire Supreme Court recently held In the Matter of Joni Guy and Daniel Guy on March 5, 2009 that in order to prove a fault-based divorce for endangering health or reason, the innocent spouse must prove that there has been more than just hurt feelings and anger. This holding raises the standard and makes this type of fault based divorce much harder to prove.  

Joni filed for divorce citing the fault grounds (NH RSA 458:7 ) of conduct endangering her health and reason, adultery, and habitual drunkenness. Alternatively, she sought a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences. (458:7-a. ) The trial court dismissed the grounds of habitual drunkenness and adultery but granted Joni the divorce on the fault grounds of conduct endangering Joni’s health and reason. The exact language of 458:7(V) is: When either party has so treated the other as seriously to injure health or endanger reason. Daniel appealed the final divorce decree based arguing that the trial court had made an error by granting Joni the fault based divorce.

The NH Supreme Court examined the meaning and standard of conduct that would be considered to injure an innocent spouse’s health and endanger their reason. The court determined that any behavior of one party which affects the other physically or mentally is treatment within the meaning of the statute. The opinion goes on to state that while the statute does not require proof of conduct that would have affected an average reasonable person, it does require proof that the health or reason of the complaining spouse was actually affected.  

The court scrutinized the conduct that Joni alleged caused her injury to her health and reason. Joni alleged that e-mails between Daniel and a former girlfriend which spoke of their love for each other and were sexually suggestive caused her to feel  “angry, upset and distraught”.

The court determined that this type of conduct is insufficient to constitute treatment that arises to the level of seriousness required by the statute. Feeling angry, upset and distraught does not constitute serious injury to one’s health or endangerment to one’s reason. The conduct at issue did not harm Joni’s physical well-being. Nor did it cause her to suffer the type of mental anguish the statute was intended to encompass. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court’s decision and sent the case back  to the trial court for further proceedings.

Crusco Law Office, PLLC Law Clerk Marisa Ulloa contributed to this post.

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On January 30, 2009 the NH Supreme Court released the opinion for In the Matter of Joseph Goulart, Jr. and Marcia Goulart in which the Court held that parents are not free to waive the provisions of the statute that prohibit any child support order requiring a parent to contribute to an adult child’s college expenses or other educational expenses beyond the completion of high school. The Court urged the legislature to reexamine the statutory language regarding approval or enforcement of a stipulated parenting plan in order to take into consideration a situation where the divorcing parties are fully informed, represented by counsel and mutually agree that one or both will voluntarily contribute to their adult child’s college expenses.

Joseph and Marcia divorced in 2005 while their son was still a minor. Part of their final divorce decree incorporated a Stipulated Parenting Plan, negotiated with counsel, which included a provision stating:

The parties are aware of the statutory provisions prohibiting the Court from ordering any parent to contribute to expenses for an adult child. Despite this prohibition the parties agree that Joseph shall be responsible for payment of the son’s college educational expenses.

In 2007, Joseph filed a motion to define his obligation regarding college expenses for the same reasons he cited before. There was a hearing and the family division ruled that Joseph was expected to assist with college expenses as agreed to in the Parenting Plan.

Joseph appealed that decision to the NH Supreme Court, contending that the family division has no authority to enforce the college education funding obligation because the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter such an order under NH RSA 461-A:14, V. The statute reads: “No child support order shall require a parent to contribute to an adult child’s college expenses or other educational expenses beyond the completion of high school.”

The Court agreed with Joseph that the statute deprived both the superior court and the family division of subject matter jurisdiction to either approve or enforce a provision in a stipulated parenting plan that requires parents to contribute to their adult child’s college expenses. The family division should have modified the parenting plan by striking the college expense provision.

Crusco Law Office Law Clerk Marisa L. Ulloa contributed to this post.

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The New Hampshire Supreme Court released In Re James N. on October 8, 2008 holding that the basis of a CHINS petition under the Child in Need of Services statute cannot be founded upon a delinquent act.

In 2007, the Mother filed a CHINS petition involving her 6 year old son James, who at the time was in DCYF’s custody. Mother alleged that he was a child in need of services for failing to obey the reasonable commands of his parent, guardian or custodian pursuant to RSA 169-D:2, II(b). The specific acts alleged in the petition were: threatening others with physical harm, threatening to set fire to a residence, harming his foster family’s dog, attempting to strangle his foster brother, head butting, biting, and placing glass “sharps” in others’ clothing.

At the hearing, James, joined by DCYF, moved to dismiss arguing that the alleged underlying facts are delinquent acts and may not be included in a CHINS petition. The court granted James’ motion finding that the petition failed because the acts alleged were delinquent acts.

The mother then filed four delinquency petitions alleging cruelty to animals, simple assault, and reckless conduct. James moved to dismiss arguing that a six-year old is presumed not to be competent to stand trial in delinquency proceedings and is presumed not to be capable of committing a crime due to his tender age. The court agreed with James and found that he could not consult with his attorney or have a rational understanding of the proceeding. Therefore, it would be a violation of his due process rights to make him stand trial.

The mother appeals to the NH Supreme Court and argues that the allegation of a delinquent act should not be fatal to a CHINS petition if the child cannot form the required mens rea (guilty mind). The court disagreed, and stated that the plain language of the statute does not allow delinquent acts to be included in a CHINS petition. Further, under the Mother’s interpretation the child would have to prove his guilt with respect to the act in order to show the act should be excluded from the petition. This would be an absurd result and the legislature would not pass an act leading to an absurdity. Additionally, the court points out that the definition of a child in need of services supports their interpretation because the definition does not overlap with the definition of a delinquent.

Crusco Law Office Law Clerk Marisa L. Ulloa contributed to this post.

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On October 8, 2008 the New Hampshire Supreme Court released an opinion for In the Matter of John Salesky and Jacqueline Salesky. The Court held that a guardian, appointed over the person and estate, may maintain a divorce action on behalf of that person with either the express authority of the Probate Court and as an equitable remedy to prevent an incompetent spouse from having no legal recourse to divorce.  

John and Jacqueline were married in 1983. In 2003, after Jacqueline had left to live with her daughter, John suffered a stroke and then named Jacqueline the co-trustee and co-beneficiary of his trust. John also created separate durable powers of attorney for healthcare, property and financial matters which named Jacqueline as his agent.

After John’s stroke, Jacqueline began draining and disbursing significant cash assets. John discovered this and at some time after that John and Jacqueline had an altercation where Jacqueline yelled “John, I don’t know what I’m going to do with you, I think I’m going to have to put you in a nursing home”. Sometime in early October 2004, John left Jacqueline and went to live with his brother and sister-in law (the Saleskys).

Later in October 2004, John filed a divorce petition on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. Jacqueline objected to this and asked for the petition to be dismissed because John was not mentally competent to bring it. In April 2005 John had a full psychiatric evaluation and the report recommended that John receive assistance in making major decisions regarding his life. After this evaluation, the Saleskys petitioned the probate court to appoint them as co-guardians over John’s person and estate. The court denied Jacqueline’s request to appoint her guardian because the parties’ marital status was in the throes of dissolution and therefore appointing her guardian was a conflict of interest.

After a three day divorce trial, the court ultimately granted the petition for divorce stating that the Saleskys as co-guardians had the authority to maintain the action on John’s behalf and that irreconcilable differences caused the irremediable breakdown of their marriage.

On appeal, Jacqueline attacked the co-guardians ability to maintain a divorce action on several grounds:

1)      Jacqueline argued that the co-guardians did not have the authority to maintain the divorce action and that the superior court interpreted the probate court’s order to confer implied authority upon the Saleskys to maintain the divorce action.

The court determined that the plain meaning of the words used in the probate courts orders expressly granted the Saleskys as co-guardians the right to marry and divorce on John’s behalf. To hold otherwise would mean that both John and the Saleskys lacked the ability to exercise those rights.

The court also examined the letter of appointment for the Salesky’s where they are specifically granted “ the authority to exercise all of the rights and powers set forth in RSA 464-A:26, I and II” and under section I, specifically requires the guardians to “prosecute or defend actions, claims or proceedings in any jurisdiction for the protection of the estate’s assets.” Therefore, these documents together expressly conferred the right to divorce to the co-guardians.

2)      Jacqueline then argued that despite the probate court’s order the Saleskys could not prosecute the divorce action because the statute did not grant them that power.

The court looks at the language of the statute stating that RSA 464-A:25 sets out the general powers and duties of a guardian over a person, and RSA 464-A:26 sets out the general powers and duties of a guardian over an estate.

Both statutes include a catchall provision that says: “The court may limit the powers of the guardian… or impose additional duties if it deems such action desirable for the best interest of the ward.

The plain meaning of the catchall provisions is that the duties are not exclusive. These provisions expressly give the probate court the authority to impose “additional duties.” The only limit upon the additional duties is that those must be “desirable for the best interests of the ward.”

3)      Jacqueline also argued that the legislature could not have reasonably intended, as a matter of public policy, to grant probate courts the authority to allow guardians to maintain divorce petitions.

The court examined a number of cases holding a competent spouse would have absolute and final control over the marriage if a guardian could not maintain an action for divorce.  That kind of situation leaves the incompetent spouse without adequate legal recourse against potential abuse. In addition, the court points out that these policy concerns are evident in this case because while Jacqueline had withdrawn substantial funds from John’s accounts while acting under a power of attorney, the Saleskys were merely maintaining a divorce action that John had brought before he was found to be incompetent.

Crusco Law Office Law Clerk Marisa L. Ulloa contributed to this post.

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Clients often ask about including in their parenting plan a provision requiring both parents to contribute to a child’s extracurricular activity expenses and uninsured medical expenses. These issues were brought before the New Hampshire Supreme Court In the Matter of Cheryl Anne Coderre and Paul A. Coderre on September 30, 2002. The father appealed an by the trial court that ordered him to pay for his children’s uninsured medical expenses and extracurricular activity expenses in addition to the child support ordered under the child support guidelines.

First, the Court determined that uninsured medical expenses are extraordinary expenses that are not included in child support guidelines. The Court looked at the statute regulating child support RSA 458-C and determined that the calculations under the guidelines are presumed to be correct but that the court may adjust the guidelines either upward or downward if it deems this deviation is warranted. More specifically looking at RSA 458-C:5, I(a) which states that the trial court “may deviate from the guideline support amount if it finds that a child will incur ongoing extraordinary medical expenses.” Therefore, the Court upheld the trial court’s order for payment of uninsured health insurance.

Additionally, the Court held that “extracurricular activity expenses are part of basic guidelines support” because they fall into the same category of such basic support as food, shelter and recreation. Because there is no language to the contrary in the guidelines the Court concluded that extracurricular activity expenses are included in the parties’ total support obligation. Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court’s decision on this matter.

In sum, a court has discretion to award uninsured medical expenses that are separate from the child support award determined by the guidelines. On the other hand, extracurricular activity expenses are considered to be included in the child support guidelines and may not be awarded separately.

Blog credit: Marisa L. Ulloa, Crusco Law Office Law Clerk

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The New Hampshire Supreme Court released an opinion today In the Matter of Kevin Gendron and Jody Plaistek that held that a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity executed in Massachusetts must be given full faith and credit and that the trial court erred in ordering genetic marker testing. The voluntary acknowledgement of paternity signed by both parents had all ready established the father as the legal father to the child, and therefore there was no need for further proof of paternity to establish parenting rights and responsibilities.

The court noted that it had made similar rulings in Watts v. Watts, which held that a father was precluded from seeking blood tests to disprove his paternity fifteen years after the children's births. In Watts, the court found that to allow the father to escape liability for support by blood tests would ignore his lengthy, voluntary acknowledgement of paternity. Here, the court noted that although the mother was seeking to disprove paternity, the result should not be any different than that in Watts.

Today's opinion should serve as a warning to anyone who voluntarily signs an acknowledgement of paternity. If there are any doubts or questions regarding paternity, seek legal counsel prior to signing the acknowledgment  because it may preclude the ability to reopen the issue of paternity in the future.

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Alimony, also called maintenance or spousal support, is payments made to a spouse or former spouse under a court order. Alimony in New Hampshire is "rehabilitative' and is based on the theory that both spouse should be able to provide for their own financial needs. Therefore, when alimony is awarded, it is designed to encourage the supported spouse to establish an independent source of income. However, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has ruled  that this theory is not controlling when the alimony recipient "suffers from ill health and is not capable of establishing an individual source of income, or where the supported spouse in a long-term marriage lacks the requisite job skills to independently approximate the standard of living established during the marriage."

In order to award alimony, the court must find that the supported party lacks sufficient income, property, or both to meet their reasonable needs and be self-supporting and that the paying party can provide for their own reasonable needs and those of the other spouse. The court should also consider the style of living to which the parties have become accustomed during the marriage in determining their reasonable needs.

How much will the court award in alimony? The court relies on several factors to determine the amount of alimony to be awarded, including:

•  the length of the marriage;
• the age, health, social or economic status, occupation, amount and sources of income, the property awarded in the divorce decree, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of each of the parties;
• the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income;
• the fault of either party;
• the federal tax consequences of the divorce order. 
• the economic contribution of each party to the value of their respective estates
• the non-economic contributions to the family unit.

To read New Hampshire's law on alimony, click here.

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