Until 2012, the burden of proof to terminate a guardianship of a child was placed upon the parent to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the substitution or supplementation of parental care and supervision was no longer necessary to provide for the child’s essential physical and safety and that terminating the guardianship would not adversely impact the child’s psychological well-being. Then, the Supreme Court issued its opinion on In the Matter of Reena D.  which implemented a two-tier standard for fit and unfit parents. The above standard still applied in cases where parents had contested a guardianship and the guardianship was granted over their objection.

However, parents that consented to a guardianship had an easier path to termination of the guardianship. Parents who consented retained their status as a “fit parent” and were entitled to the Troxel v. Granville presumption that a fit parent acts in their child’s best interests. Thus, the standard for termination of a guardianship established by consent shifts the burden to the guardian to prove by clear and convincing evidence “that substitution or supplementation of parental care and supervision” is “necessary to provide for the essential physical and safety needs of the minor” and that terminating the guardianship will “adversely affect the minor’s psychological well-being.” The New Hampshire Supreme Court juxtaposed this standard with a guardianship established over a parents’ objection pointing out that the Troxel presumption is overcome during the establishment of a contested guardianship.

            The New Hampshire Legislature recently updated the guardianship statute to implement a new standard for termination of a guardianship if the guardian is the grandparent of the child. Effective January 1, 2018, the statute provides that if guardianship over a child was granted to a grandparent as the result of the parent’s substance abuse or dependence, the standard for termination of the guardianship is:

the burden of proof shall be on the parent to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that substitution or supplementation of parental care and supervision is no longer necessary to provide for the essential physical and safety needs of the minor and termination of the guardianship will not adversely affect the minor’s psychological well-being.

This standard applies whether the guardianship was contested or uncontested. With this change, a fit parent who agrees to a guardianship because of the parent’s substance abuse or dependence will have the same standard for terminating the guardianship as any parent whose children are under guardianship over their objection. At first glance, this change appears ripe for constitutional challenge. The fact that a parent has a substance abuse problem does not negate their rights under Troxel. A parent with a substance problem can still have the insight to act in their child’s best interests by finding alternative care for the child while they seek treatment.  

Nuclear families often have annual holiday traditions. A family may spend each Thanksgiving with paternal grandparents, Easter with a favorite uncle and Christmas Eve at church services with maternal grandparents. Kids look forward to these annual traditions.

However, if parents divorce, kids are split, often into alternating holidays. A traditional holiday parenting schedule may look something like this:

  • Easter: even years with mom, odd years with dad 9 am to 6 pm
  • July 4th: even years with dad, odd years with mom 9 am overnight to 9 am
  • Halloween: even years with mom, odd years with dad 9 am overnight to 9 am
  • Thanksgiving: even years with dad, odd years with mom 9 am to 6 pm
  • Christmas Eve: even years with mom, odd years with dad 12 pm overnight to 12 pm
  • Christmas Day: even years with dad, odd years with mom 12 pm overnight to 12 pm

While this schedule may provide the opportunity to have holiday time every two years with their children, it does not have the continuity the children were used to before the divorce.

I had a client suggest an idea that I thought was brilliant. Instead of alternating, each parent would have set holidays. Under this idea, the kids could enjoy 4th of July every year at mom’s family’s summer camp, host dad’s family for turkey and football on Thanksgiving and continue going to church on Christmas Eve with their maternal grandparents. The parents could still alternate the Christmas overnight, but maintain a consistent, fixed schedule for the remaining holiday time. The parent who does not have parenting time on a holiday can still plan celebrations around a holiday. For example, the non-holiday parent can bring the children to an Easter egg hunt, fireworks, or a haunted house adventure during their parenting time.

 

On August 23, 2016, the New Hampshire Supreme Court issued an opinion in Ross and Ross. It is a fascinating case about adultery and new relationships during a divorce. The outcome is a cautionary tale for persons seeking fault grounds for divorce.  

The Facts

Husband and wife met in dental school and later married. Husband, who had his own endodontist practice, helped his wife open and build her orthodontist practice. Considerable money was put into the venture. The couple separated the day that husband discovered wife was having an affair with another dentist. Wife filed for divorce 5 days after the parties separated alleging both fault and irreconcilable differences as grounds. Husband cross-petitioned for divorce on fault-based grounds, due to the wife’s alleged adultery and irreconcilable differences. The parties had been married for 9 years at the time they filed for divorce.

Approximately 11 months after the divorce was file, husband began a sexual relationship with the ex-wife of the dentist wife was dating. Wife filed a motion to dismiss the adultery grounds pled against her. She argued the defense of recrimination, or in other words that the husband was no longer an “innocent spouse” because of his own adultery. The trial court agreed with wife and dismissed the husband’s fault grounds. The trial court issued a decree of divorce based on irreconcilable differences that divided the property with an intent to split it equally.

The Appeal

Husband appealed the dismissal of the fault-based ground in his cross-petition for divorce, arguing that his sexual relationship, which occurred eleven months after the parties’ separation, could not be used as a basis for the defense of recrimination. Husband asserted that such a holding would require parties to remain celibate during years of litigation in a contentious divorce. Wife argued the trial court did not err in granting the motion to dismiss because the respondent was not an “innocent party” within the meaning of the statute. RSA 458:7 (2004).

The Court examined RSA 458:7, which states that a divorce “shall be decreed in favor of the innocent party.” The statute requires that one be an “innocent party” at the time of the decree. The statute makes no exception for fault based grounds that arise prior to the final decree, regardless of whether they arise before or after the filing of the divorce petition. Therefore, the trial court correctly considered Husband’s post-petition conduct when deciding the motion to dismiss.
The Court further stated the fact that Husband’s adultery did not lead to the breakdown of the marriage does not bar recrimination as a defense, stating “Causation is not an element of the defense of recrimination.”

The Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to dismiss the fault grounds and grant a divorce on irreconcilable differences.

The Takeaway

The conclusion of husband’s brief, artfully written by Attorney Joshua Gordon, argues: “It is not reasonable to suggest, in these times of protracted discovery and litigation, that a party to a divorce must remain celibate for the duration of the proceedings – here already longer than four years.” I happen to agree with him. Litigation can be a long and arduous process. While most divorces will settle within 6 months to 1 year, a small percentage can drag on. The longest divorce I have seen from start to finish has been 5 years. That is a long time to wait to date.

Why pursue the adultery grounds in the first place? It appears in this case that there was some significant bad blood between the parties. Husband had helped wife open her orthodontic practice and contributed financially and emotionally to that endeavor. In return, wife carried on an affair with a colleague for approximately five years. Wife changed the locks to the house two days after husband left. Husband may have been pursuing the emotional victory of a fault based divorce for wife’s cheating.

Husband may also have been pursuing the adultery grounds for the financial benefit. RSA 458:16-a, II provides that a court may divide property unequally when it would be appropriate and equitable to do so after considering one more of the statutory factors. One of the factors reads:  “The fault of either party as specified in RSA 458:7 if said fault caused the breakdown of the marriage and: (1) Caused substantial physical or mental pain and suffering; or  (2) Resulted in substantial economic loss to the marital estate or the injured party.” With the dental practices, marital home and savings and investments on the line, an uneven split make a substantial difference in the outcome.

However, in my experience, most judges are not persuaded to award a significantly higher portion of the property to the “innocent spouse,” even if they can prove that the adultery caused the breakdown of the marriage and substantial economic loss to the marriage or injured spouse. More than a 45/55 split without other contributing factors would be unusual.

The moral of this story is that there must be a careful cost benefit analysis when filing adultery. Is the litigant willing to remain celibate no matter how long the litigation takes? Is there substantial property up for division that would make even a small deviation from 50/50 worthwhile? Is the time, money and celibacy for a finding that the other spouse cheated sensible?

 

In my years practicing family law, I have heard a lot of misconceptions about what is marital property. While the definition of marital property may differ between states, in New Hampshire marital property is anything and everything owned by the parties.

I hear questions such as "Only my name is on the house, so that is off the table right?" Wrong. It does not matter how the house is titled. It can be in either name individually or owned jointly. Another statement often made is "I owned the house before the marriage so I get to keep it." This is also wrong. It does not matter when or how the property was purchased, everything goes into the pot to be divided.

The definition of marital property is found at RSA 458:16-a. The statute states:

Property shall include all tangible and intangible property and assets, real or personal, belonging to either or both parties, whether title to the property is held in the name of either or both parties. Intangible property includes, but is not limited to, employment benefits, vested and non-vested pension or other retirement benefits, or savings plans. To the extent permitted by federal law, property shall include military retirement and veterans’ disability benefits.

However, just because everything is subject to division by the courts, that does not mean that it will be. RSA 458:16-a also says that the court can deviate from an equal division based on variety of factors, including the length of the marriage, what property was owned prior to the marriage, and the contributions of each party to the marital property. Each case is based on the specific facts and circumstances of the couple.

I appreciate when judges talk to the parties at the end of the hearing. Today, following a hearing regarding disagreements about unilateral decision making and information sharing, the judge told the parties to ask themselves: Would you want to know? It is the perfect question for self-reflection in co-parenting. 

  • If a doctor needed to be selected for your child, would you want to have input?
  • If your children were traveling by airplane to a different state, would you want to have the flight, lodging and contact information?
  • If your child was going to be participating on a sports team, would you want information about cost and schedule?

It comes down to the golden rule – do unto others as you would have done unto you. 

 

Over the years, I have had several clients come to me with issues regarding the retroactivity of a child support modification. These situations have included circumstances such as informal modifications of child support which were never filed with the court to demands from the other parent to make a modification retroactive to the date of a substantial change, such as a child turning 18 or graduating from high school, without any pending petition to modify. There is an easy answer, which often results in a difficult situation.

A child support order cannot be modified prior to the date that the party receives notice of the petition for modification. RSA 458-C:7 defines “notice” as either service as specified in the civil account or acceptance of a copy of the petition by certified mail receipt. The trial court may, however, order modification prospectively from the date of service forward. If it takes months, or even a year, to conduct a hearing and issue an order, either party runs the risk of the modification dating back to the time of service.

There is however a small narrow exception contained in the case law. In the case of In Re Nicholson the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that due to specific language in the parties divorce decree and uniform support order the child support could be modified retroactively to the time of the substantial change in circumstances (in this case a child becoming ineligible). In this case, the child support order had specific language as follows:

Unless the court … specifies differently, the amount of a child support obligation stated in the order for support shall remain as stated in the order until all dependent children for whom support is provided in the order shall terminate their high school education or reach the age of 18 years, whichever is later, or become married, or become a member of the armed forces, at which time the child support obligation terminates without further legal action. This amount shall remain as specified unless a legal order expressly allocates the payments on a per child basis.

This language is no longer in the standard uniform support order. Now, the SO -3C reads:

The effective date of any modification shall be no earlier than the date of notice to the other party. “Notice” means either of the following: 1) service as specified in civil actions or 2) the respondent’s acceptance of a copy of the petition, as long as the petition is filed no later than 30 days following the respondent’s acceptance.

Notwithstanding the narrow exception contained in Nicholson, it is very important that any agreements to modify child support be signed and filed with the court for approval. It is likewise critical that when a substantial change occurs, the petition must be filed immediately to preserve the ability to modify child support. Without taking these steps, a party could end up owing a substantial debt in child support when the other party seeks enforcement of the order rather than the informal agreement or the obligor has sat on their right to modify and must continue to pay at the higher rate of support. 
 

The New Hampshire Supreme Court issued its opinion In the Matter of Mary Sheys and Eric Blackburn on July 15, 2015. 

The Facts

Mother and father married in 2005. They had two children during their marriage. When they divorced in New Hampshire in 2009, the parties agreed on a parenting plan providing mother with primary residential responsibility. Father exercised parenting time every other weekend, two afternoons per week and two weeks in the summer. In January 2013 mother told father she was relocating to Natick, Massachusetts with the children to take a new job after having been unemployed since November 2012. Mother moved the following month in February 2013. After the move, father filed in New Hampshire for primary residential responsibility and contempt. The 9th Circuit – Family Division – Manchester denied the father’s requested relief and entered a new parenting plan providing father with parenting time on alternating weekends, summers, school vacations and time in Natick as the father was available.

In December of 2013 father again asked the court to modify the parties’ parenting plan. Mother asked the court to dismiss the matter as she and the children had been residing in Massachusetts for over a year and she had already filed a motion in the Massachusetts Probate & Family Court to modify the parties’ divorce decree and parenting plan. The court granted mother’s motion to dismiss finding that it was appropriate for the court to decline continuing jurisdiction over this matter because mother and the children no longer had a significant connection with the State of New Hampshire.

The Appeal

The father appealed arguing that the trial court erred when it ruled that the children did not have a significant connection with New Hampshire

The Holding

As a matter of first impression, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) New Hampshire had continuing exclusive jurisdiction to deal with the post-divorce parenting matters. The Court agreed with the majority of jurisdictions in finding a child has a “significant connection” with New Hampshire when one parent still resides in state and exercises more than de minimis parenting time in New Hampshire. The Court noted that although the mother asked the Court to affirm on the alternative grounds of inconvenient forum, this issue was never argued and the trial court never considered it.

The Takeaway

This case provides clarification that New Hampshire will continue to hear parenting matters even after New Hampshire is no longer the “home state” of the child. The UCCJEA takes a broad view. The opinion notes that most states have determined that the “significant connection” requirement in the act can be met so long as the parent that remains in the state exercises some parenting time. For example, a Georgia court found a significant connection for parenting time that was exercised every other weekend and 8 weeks in the summer. Here, the Father exercised parenting time in New Hampshire on alternating weekends, two non-consecutive weeks in the summer, five days during April vacation in even years and five days during February vacation in odd years.

This holding may make it more difficult for a custodial parent to litigate from their new state. However, the Court left open the issue of whether New Hampshire may be an inconvenient forum under RSA 458-A:18. Custodial parents may still be able to transfer the case to their new state with an inconvenient forum argument.

 

After you receive the GAL report and read it, your first instinct might be to share the document with family, friends and perhaps professionals such as therapists or teachers. It is important to hold back on this urge because the GAL report is confidential.

Circuit Court Rule 2.15 states: “Written reports of the guardian ad litem shall be kept in an envelope marked confidential within the court file, and shall only be disclosed to parties or attorneys to the action.” The GAL Report is not part of the public court file that is accessible to any person with enough curiosity to travel to the courthouse to review the file. Thus, makes sure you obtain either agreement from any other party to the case or a court order allowing the GAL report to be disseminated.

A court will look to many factors under RSA 461-A:6 when making an initial determination of parental rights and responsibilities. Provided that each parent is capable of providing a safe, loving home, one of the most important factors that will be considered is the ability of each parent to support the relationship of the children with the other parent. Three specific factors under the statute read:

  • "The ability and disposition of each parent to foster a positive relationship and frequent and continuing physical, written, and telephonic contact with the other parent, including whether contact is likely to result in harm to the child or to a parent."
  • " The support of each parent for the child’s contact with the other parent as shown by allowing and promoting such contact, including whether contact is likely to result in harm to the child or to a parent."
  • "The support of each parent for the child’s relationship with the other parent, including whether contact is likely to result in harm to the child or to a parent."

Following the Patriots amazing Superbowl victory (Yayyyyyy Pats!!!!), I came across an article commending actress Bridget Moynahan, Tom Brady’s ex-girlfriend and the mother of his oldest child, for her gracious congratulatory tweet sent out while her son was celebrating on the field with his dad, stepmother and half-siblings:

Christine Coppa, the article’s author and a single mom writes about the difficult journey a parent must go through to come out on the other side a supportive co-parent. She observes:

Moynahan has “moved past the bitter parts that most breakups create, and onto accepting their relationship as a unique family,” relationship expert Amy Spencer, author of Meeting Your Half-Orangeand Bright Side Up, tells Yahoo Parenting. “Her son should be damn proud of his dad, and that tweet is a beautiful sign that Bridget wants to support her son that way.”

Supportive co-parenting allows the child to see her parents as a team rather than as opponents, and that is critical to their adjustment and development. As mentioned above, it can also be the decisive factor for a court when determining residential responsibility. There are numerous resources available to assist parents in the co-parenting journey. Here are some of my favorites:

 

In the Matter of Susan Spenard and David Spenard was decided on October 17, 2014

The Facts
Husband and Wife married in 1998. During the marriage the Husband worked in real estate and owned several businesses and the Wife worked as an entertainer. Before the parties’ divorce decree was issued, the Husband sold a promissory note that he had failed to disclose on his financial affidavit. During the divorce trial, the Wife argued that she could no longer work at all due to medical issues. She failed to present any expert testimony to back up her claim, however, and the Court found that she was voluntarily unemployed. The Wife filed a Motion to Reconsider and sought to present new evidence of her medical issues. The Court denied her Motion.

The Appeal
The Wife appealed on three grounds. First, the Wife argued that RSA 458-C:2 requires an express finding of under or unemployment when presented with evidence supporting such a claim. Second, she argued that the lower Court erred in refusing to reopen her case based on her newly discovered medical evidence supporting her claim that she cannot work. Third, the Wife argued that the Husband’s promissory notes were marital property, and, therefore, subject to equitable distribution.

The Holding
First, the Court held that whether or not a party is voluntarily under or unemployed is a question of fact for the fact-finder, and RSA 458-C:2 does not require an express finding of voluntary under or unemployment when presented with evidence of such a claim. Second, the Court held that a party who seeks to reopen a case to submit new evidence must demonstrate that s/he was not at fault for failing to present such evidence at the hearing. Mere difficulty or financial expense of obtaining such evidence is not sufficient to overcome this burden. Third, the Court held that promissory notes are marital property and thus must be listed on financial affidavits and are subject to equitable distribution.