New Hampshire Supreme Court

On August 23, 2016, the New Hampshire Supreme Court issued an opinion in Ross and Ross. It is a fascinating case about adultery and new relationships during a divorce. The outcome is a cautionary tale for persons seeking fault grounds for divorce.  

The Facts

Husband and wife met in dental school and later married. Husband, who had his own endodontist practice, helped his wife open and build her orthodontist practice. Considerable money was put into the venture. The couple separated the day that husband discovered wife was having an affair with another dentist. Wife filed for divorce 5 days after the parties separated alleging both fault and irreconcilable differences as grounds. Husband cross-petitioned for divorce on fault-based grounds, due to the wife’s alleged adultery and irreconcilable differences. The parties had been married for 9 years at the time they filed for divorce.

Approximately 11 months after the divorce was file, husband began a sexual relationship with the ex-wife of the dentist wife was dating. Wife filed a motion to dismiss the adultery grounds pled against her. She argued the defense of recrimination, or in other words that the husband was no longer an “innocent spouse” because of his own adultery. The trial court agreed with wife and dismissed the husband’s fault grounds. The trial court issued a decree of divorce based on irreconcilable differences that divided the property with an intent to split it equally.

The Appeal

Husband appealed the dismissal of the fault-based ground in his cross-petition for divorce, arguing that his sexual relationship, which occurred eleven months after the parties’ separation, could not be used as a basis for the defense of recrimination. Husband asserted that such a holding would require parties to remain celibate during years of litigation in a contentious divorce. Wife argued the trial court did not err in granting the motion to dismiss because the respondent was not an “innocent party” within the meaning of the statute. RSA 458:7 (2004).

The Court examined RSA 458:7, which states that a divorce “shall be decreed in favor of the innocent party.” The statute requires that one be an “innocent party” at the time of the decree. The statute makes no exception for fault based grounds that arise prior to the final decree, regardless of whether they arise before or after the filing of the divorce petition. Therefore, the trial court correctly considered Husband’s post-petition conduct when deciding the motion to dismiss.
The Court further stated the fact that Husband’s adultery did not lead to the breakdown of the marriage does not bar recrimination as a defense, stating “Causation is not an element of the defense of recrimination.”

The Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to dismiss the fault grounds and grant a divorce on irreconcilable differences.

The Takeaway

The conclusion of husband’s brief, artfully written by Attorney Joshua Gordon, argues: “It is not reasonable to suggest, in these times of protracted discovery and litigation, that a party to a divorce must remain celibate for the duration of the proceedings – here already longer than four years.” I happen to agree with him. Litigation can be a long and arduous process. While most divorces will settle within 6 months to 1 year, a small percentage can drag on. The longest divorce I have seen from start to finish has been 5 years. That is a long time to wait to date.

Why pursue the adultery grounds in the first place? It appears in this case that there was some significant bad blood between the parties. Husband had helped wife open her orthodontic practice and contributed financially and emotionally to that endeavor. In return, wife carried on an affair with a colleague for approximately five years. Wife changed the locks to the house two days after husband left. Husband may have been pursuing the emotional victory of a fault based divorce for wife’s cheating.

Husband may also have been pursuing the adultery grounds for the financial benefit. RSA 458:16-a, II provides that a court may divide property unequally when it would be appropriate and equitable to do so after considering one more of the statutory factors. One of the factors reads:  “The fault of either party as specified in RSA 458:7 if said fault caused the breakdown of the marriage and: (1) Caused substantial physical or mental pain and suffering; or  (2) Resulted in substantial economic loss to the marital estate or the injured party.” With the dental practices, marital home and savings and investments on the line, an uneven split make a substantial difference in the outcome.

However, in my experience, most judges are not persuaded to award a significantly higher portion of the property to the “innocent spouse,” even if they can prove that the adultery caused the breakdown of the marriage and substantial economic loss to the marriage or injured spouse. More than a 45/55 split without other contributing factors would be unusual.

The moral of this story is that there must be a careful cost benefit analysis when filing adultery. Is the litigant willing to remain celibate no matter how long the litigation takes? Is there substantial property up for division that would make even a small deviation from 50/50 worthwhile? Is the time, money and celibacy for a finding that the other spouse cheated sensible?

 

The New Hampshire Supreme Court issued its opinion In the Matter of Mary Sheys and Eric Blackburn on July 15, 2015. 

The Facts

Mother and father married in 2005. They had two children during their marriage. When they divorced in New Hampshire in 2009, the parties agreed on a parenting plan providing mother with primary residential responsibility. Father exercised parenting time every other weekend, two afternoons per week and two weeks in the summer. In January 2013 mother told father she was relocating to Natick, Massachusetts with the children to take a new job after having been unemployed since November 2012. Mother moved the following month in February 2013. After the move, father filed in New Hampshire for primary residential responsibility and contempt. The 9th Circuit – Family Division – Manchester denied the father’s requested relief and entered a new parenting plan providing father with parenting time on alternating weekends, summers, school vacations and time in Natick as the father was available.

In December of 2013 father again asked the court to modify the parties’ parenting plan. Mother asked the court to dismiss the matter as she and the children had been residing in Massachusetts for over a year and she had already filed a motion in the Massachusetts Probate & Family Court to modify the parties’ divorce decree and parenting plan. The court granted mother’s motion to dismiss finding that it was appropriate for the court to decline continuing jurisdiction over this matter because mother and the children no longer had a significant connection with the State of New Hampshire.

The Appeal

The father appealed arguing that the trial court erred when it ruled that the children did not have a significant connection with New Hampshire

The Holding

As a matter of first impression, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) New Hampshire had continuing exclusive jurisdiction to deal with the post-divorce parenting matters. The Court agreed with the majority of jurisdictions in finding a child has a “significant connection” with New Hampshire when one parent still resides in state and exercises more than de minimis parenting time in New Hampshire. The Court noted that although the mother asked the Court to affirm on the alternative grounds of inconvenient forum, this issue was never argued and the trial court never considered it.

The Takeaway

This case provides clarification that New Hampshire will continue to hear parenting matters even after New Hampshire is no longer the “home state” of the child. The UCCJEA takes a broad view. The opinion notes that most states have determined that the “significant connection” requirement in the act can be met so long as the parent that remains in the state exercises some parenting time. For example, a Georgia court found a significant connection for parenting time that was exercised every other weekend and 8 weeks in the summer. Here, the Father exercised parenting time in New Hampshire on alternating weekends, two non-consecutive weeks in the summer, five days during April vacation in even years and five days during February vacation in odd years.

This holding may make it more difficult for a custodial parent to litigate from their new state. However, the Court left open the issue of whether New Hampshire may be an inconvenient forum under RSA 458-A:18. Custodial parents may still be able to transfer the case to their new state with an inconvenient forum argument.

 

In the Matter of Susan Spenard and David Spenard was decided on October 17, 2014

The Facts
Husband and Wife married in 1998. During the marriage the Husband worked in real estate and owned several businesses and the Wife worked as an entertainer. Before the parties’ divorce decree was issued, the Husband sold a promissory note that he had failed to disclose on his financial affidavit. During the divorce trial, the Wife argued that she could no longer work at all due to medical issues. She failed to present any expert testimony to back up her claim, however, and the Court found that she was voluntarily unemployed. The Wife filed a Motion to Reconsider and sought to present new evidence of her medical issues. The Court denied her Motion.

The Appeal
The Wife appealed on three grounds. First, the Wife argued that RSA 458-C:2 requires an express finding of under or unemployment when presented with evidence supporting such a claim. Second, she argued that the lower Court erred in refusing to reopen her case based on her newly discovered medical evidence supporting her claim that she cannot work. Third, the Wife argued that the Husband’s promissory notes were marital property, and, therefore, subject to equitable distribution.

The Holding
First, the Court held that whether or not a party is voluntarily under or unemployed is a question of fact for the fact-finder, and RSA 458-C:2 does not require an express finding of voluntary under or unemployment when presented with evidence of such a claim. Second, the Court held that a party who seeks to reopen a case to submit new evidence must demonstrate that s/he was not at fault for failing to present such evidence at the hearing. Mere difficulty or financial expense of obtaining such evidence is not sufficient to overcome this burden. Third, the Court held that promissory notes are marital property and thus must be listed on financial affidavits and are subject to equitable distribution.

 

In the Matter of Cheryl Serodio and Arthur Perkins: Existence of Prenuptial Agreements can be proven without providing the written, executed agreement. The New Hampshire Supreme Court issued its opinion on August 22, 2014.

The Facts

Wife filed for divorce from Husband in 2010.  In 2011, Husband filed a motion to have a prenuptial agreement enforced.  Husband did not present the family court with a copy of the agreement with Wife’s signature, because he alleged that Wife held the sole, signed copy, and she had lost it. Wife filed a motion to dismiss Husband’s claim, arguing that she never signed a prenuptial agreement.  Wife also argued that even if she had signed a prenuptial agreement she did not do so voluntarily because she was coerced.  The trial court granted Wife’s motion to dismiss.  The trial court granted Wife’s motion on two grounds.  First, the Court held that a prenuptial agreement that is not signed by the party charged is unenforceable.  Second, the Court stated that even if the parties had an oral prenuptial agreement, oral prenuptial agreements are unenforceable.

The Appeal

Husband appealed and argued that the trial court did not apply the correct standard of review to Wife’s motion to dismiss. He argued that the real issue that trial court should have considered was whether a properly executed agreement existed before he and Wife were married, not if the properly signed agreement existed now.

 The Holding

The Supreme Court agreed with Husband and reversed the family court’s decision.  The Court held that, while RSA 506:2 requires that any agreement made in consideration of marriage be in writing, the actual writing need not be produced to prove its existence.  A Court can find that a prenuptial agreement existed based on extrinsic evidence, including testimony.

The Takeaway

Make sure you keep your important documents such as prenuptial agreements and estate plans in a safe place. Upload a copy to your icloud, give a copy to several relatives, or keep it in a safety deposit box. The good news is that the Perkins holding will allow you to attempt to enforce the prenup anyway. The bad news is the effect of not being able to produce a copy of the agreement is a very expensive trial. 

 

 

A few years ago, during the state’s fiscal crisis, the legislature did away with the statute requiring that any parent accused of abusing or neglecting their child in a child protection case be appointed an attorney to represent them. I posted here about my view that all parents should be entitled to counsel in abuse neglect proceedings. The issue was argued before the New Hampshire Supreme Court in In Re C.M, where the Court held that parents do not have a constitutional per se right to counsel, though appointment of counsel should be considered on a case by case basis. In July 2013, the legislature reinstated the statutory authority under RSA 169-C:10, II (a) requiring court appointment counsel for indigent parents. 

Now, there are proposed changes to a parent’s statutory right to counsel which would require the attorney to withdraw following the dispositional hearing unless there was a court order noting the specific duration and purpose of the continued representation.. The New Hampshire Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Rules has requested comment from the bench, bar, legislature, executive branch or public. The report on the rule changes can be found here

A colleague of mine, Lucinda Hopkins, who is an experienced abuse neglect attorney, wrote to the New Hampshire Supreme Court Advisory a wonderful letter expressing why this rule change is ill advised. She has given me permission to share. I hope you will take a moment to read and perhaps reach out to the committee yourself to express your opinion. For more information on how to contact the committee for comment, see here

Date: 5 September 2014

To: New Hampshire Supreme Court Advisory
Committee on Rules
From: Lucinda Hopkins, Attorney at Law,
NH Bar ID # 1193
Re: Proposed Rule Change deeming parent’s legal counsel withdrawn after neglect or abuse dispositional hearing

Dear Committee Members,

Let’s start with the premise that a parent in a neglect or abuse matter should have legal representation. In a world where money is no object I doubt most people would object to legal representation for parents in a neglect or abuse proceeding. Thus, encroaching on legal representation for a parent in a neglect or abuse matter stems from financial considerations.

The second premise is the child is the paramount consideration in a neglect or abuse proceeding. I went to law school to advocate on behalf of children. After 30 plus years of practice I have a fair amount of experience which I hope will shed light on how legal counsel for parents not only serve to promote and protect the interests of the parents but also serve to safeguard the interests of the children.

The state’s role is driven by policies that may coincide with the a child’s interest but may also diverge. Otherwise, we would not need judicial oversight: the child protection system could act administratively. Removing children from their homes and severing family ties, however, carries significant societal implications. The court system serves as the proper forum when the state takes such actions.

Federal laws impose on the state agency the ideal of "permanency" and enforce this ideal by monetary incentives. This agency perspective may override what the child needs. Further, neglect and abuse law–as with all aspects of law–fluctuates. What is laudable today may–often through the efforts of legal advocates–come to be recognized as unacceptable.

A Guardian ad Litem, a party along with the state and parent, is not a legal advocate, most often not trained as a lawyer, and does not have the expertise or the role to legally advocate for a child. Neither the state nor the Guardian ad Litem possess the intimate knowledge and bond with the child that a parent does.

Since neglect or abuse proceedings are confidential, how children fare in the child welfare system remains a mystery. I know from my own experience that "permanency" has not always lived up to its ideal. I have heard from foster parents who adopted children, now adults, who I represented that when the children reached the age of majority sought out their birth parents and went to live with them. I have stayed in touch with children, now adults, who I represented who sought out and maintain contact with their birth parents. I have represented a parent in a neglect matter who lost her child to an adoptive family, where the child was abused and ended back in the system traumatized and psychologically damaged. I have been involved in a matter where the state confidently assured the court that a child was adoptable, a termination of parental rights was granted, and the child remained (at least during the time I was aware) unadopted and without any family whatsoever. I recall another case where the child eloquently expressed wanting both the parent and the foster parent to be part of the child’s life.

I present these anecdotes to emphasize that the state and the Guardian ad Litem are not necessarily the ones speaking for what the children want. To the contrary, as they so often state, they are driven by the goals of permanency. I ask the committee to seriously consider how crucial legal representation is for questioning public policy and decisions permanently affecting and altering individual lives.

I would be astounded if the vast majority of neglect or abuse court cases did not involve individuals with minimal financial resources, disabilities, childhood trauma, dysfunctional family backgrounds, and scant education. Post-dispositional hearing is where legal advocacy most helps a parent. Some–but not all–of the critical issues that arise where a parent needs legal expertise and result in reunification or termination of parental rights include:

 

  • Whether the state needs a psychological evaluation and if so how to ensure an evaluation is fair and thorough or lacks validity.
  • How to navigate housing requirements by the state that the parent have a certain amount of bedrooms for the children’s return home when the parent does not have custody of the children.
  • Whether a bonding assessment is necessary and if so, how a fair evaluation can best be conducted.
  • Whether a parent aide is accommodating a parent’s disability, and if not, what accommodations are needed
  • Whether the siblings’ bonds are appropriately considered.
  • Consideration of how best to address siblings’ differing wants and needs.
  • How to address domestic violence issues and their effect on permanently severing a parent’s rights.
  • How to address substance abuse issues and their effect on permanently severing a parent’s rights.
  • How to address medical issues and their effect on permanently severing a parent’s rights.
  • Holding the state accountable for implementation of services that are reasonable and appropriate.
  • Countering the presentation of evidence as relevant or material and presenting relevant or material information that may not be disclosed.
  • Understanding how other laws, such as the American with Disabilities Act, guardianship statutes, and domestic relations and immigration laws relate to a neglect or abuse proceeding.
  • How incarceration relates to compliance with neglect or abuse dispositional orders.
  • Whether visitation provisions are unduly restrictive and if so, whether the court or the state has the discretion to decide visitation.
  • Whether a child should have legal counsel.
  • Whether the state has to comply with an order for mediating an alternative long-term living arrangement for the child or an open adoption.
  • Whether an interlocutory appeal or writ of certiorari should be filed to protect a parent’s rights before a termination of parental rights is filed.
  • Ensuring that discovery is forthcoming in order to assess a parent’s compliance with dispositional orders and to counter disputed representations.
  • Understanding and ensuring compliance with the state’s policies for neglect and abuse matters.
  • Investigating and advocating in relation to relative placement particularly when such placement is disputed (either by the agency or the parent).
  • Understanding the inner workings of the Interstate Compact on Placement of Children Act: how to facilitate the administrative process in each state.
  • Understanding how the Indian Child Welfare Act may impact a neglect or abuse proceeding.
  • Analyzing jurisdictional issues relating to a neglect or abuse proceeding with another proceeding relating to jurisdiction of the child.
  • Understanding how the Uniform Child Custody and Jurisdiction Act relates to a neglect or abuse proceeding.
  • Understanding available resources, such as shelters, what shelters are appropriate, and alternatives when factors prevent access.
  • Understanding mental illness, treatment, and medication needs.
  • Understanding substance abuse, treatment, and compliance.
  • Understanding parole or probation conditions in conjunction with dispositional orders.
  • Knowledge and appreciation of a parent’s constitutional rights and the ability to argue those rights.

Lest you think I went through some kind of checklist or reviewed laws relating to neglect or abuse proceedings, the following list was written off the top of my head from memory. I have encountered each of these issues. From conversations with fellow practitioners they have grappled with these along with other issues after a dispositional hearing. The list is nowhere complete.

I hope I have conveyed the ultimate difference legal representation can make in a neglect or abuse proceeding post-dispositional. I also hope I have caused you to consider that the state and the Guardian ad Litem are not necessarily always right when it comes to promoting a child’s interest. If this were so, we could dispense with court proceedings.

I ask you to consider also that a parent, the one who has been most intimately connected to the child, trusts her or his lawyer. The parent will confide in the lawyer and divulge information to the lawyer that the parent may not convey to the state, the Guardian ad Litem, or the court. The parent often does not appreciate the need for advocacy. The lawyer also will help the parent when that parent is not up to the responsibility of adequately caring for a child by counseling the parent to engage in the process in a way that minimizes the suffering for everyone.

Most importantly, the child did not come into world alone. I have found it best to be humble in expecting prevailing laws to have all the answers. To remove a parent’s lawyer from a neglect or abuse proceeding when the lawyer’s services are most needed, removes the opportunity to question laws and decisions that need to be challenged. The court needs a full adversarial system to get the full picture. Neither the state nor the Guardian ad Litem compensates for the parent’s voice. Parents need legal representation for their voices to be heard. Children, the paramount consideration, need–as much as the voices of the state and Guardian ad Litem–to have the voices of their parents heard.

Sincerely,

Lucinda Hopkins
603.361.8168
www.nhlawhelp.com

When negotiating a settlement, it is important to keep in mind that New Hampshire law does not allow parties to waive future alimony. The 1994 case of Norberg v. Norberg is controlling. It explains that although property division is not modifiable, alimony is an entirely different matter. Even if the parties enter into an agreement that expressly waives their right to seek alimony, the court retains the authority to revise its orders under RSA 458:14

How this factors into settlement negotiations will depend on the facts of your case. First, whether you go to trial or reach a settlement, the court will retain the authority to modify alimony. It should be carefully considered when providing the other party with  a larger division of the assets or taking on additional debt in exchange for a reduced term or amount of alimony. Knowledge of the standards for modification, especially in light of the recent Lyon decision, will also be important to come to a knowing and voluntary settlement. 

On May 30, 2014, the New Hampshire Supreme Court issued an opinion In the Matter of Lyon. This decision clarifies the standard to be applied in requests to extend or renew alimony. 

The Facts

Husband and Wife divorced in May 2007. They entered into a permanent stipulation that was incorporated into their divorce decree that required Husband to pay to Wife $3,000 per month in alimony from January 1, 2007, through June 30, 2007, and $5,000 in monthly alimony from July 1, 2007, through June 30, 2012, “or until the death of either party, whichever first occurs.”

A month before the scheduled termination of the alimony, the Wife petitioned for an additional three years. She alleged that her newly diagnosed attention deficit hyperactivity disorder necessitated an extension of alimony so that she could afford her medication and finish her education. The Husband filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that the Wife had failed to establish an unanticipated or unforeseeable substantial change in circumstances. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the petition.  

The Appeal

The Wife appealed and argued that the trial court erred by applying the standards that govern a motion to modify alimony to her petition to extend. Although the standard to modify required a person to prove that a substantial change in circumstances had occurred since the original award that made the amount of alimony either improper or unfair, she argued that she was not required to meet that test. Instead, she said that she was subject to the same standard as an initial award of alimony.

The Holding

The Supreme Court held that when a party seeks to extend or renew, either in modified or unmodified form, “the burden is upon the party in whose favor the order is to run to establish that justice requires a renewal or extension, and if so, what justice requires as to amount[,] . . . in the light of all the circumstances then existing.”

The Takeaway

The standard articulated in the Lyons decision will be easier to meet for alimony recipients as opposed to a substantial change in circumstance test.  This has the potential to create a chilling effect a person’s willingness to agree to pay alimony as one can be less certain of the end date for the payments. Even so, the recipient must still prove that justice requires an extension. While the facts do not require a substantial change in circumstances, it seems likely that the trial court would still examine all of the circumstances to determine why, if short term alimony was awarded, the recipient has not put him or herself into a position to be self-supporting.

 

Miller v. Todd, a parenting case between two parties who were never married, raised the issue of whether Supreme Court Rule 3 is unconstitutional because it treats married and unmarried parents differently for the purposes of an appeal. At the time, only parents who were married were entitled to a mandatory appeal from an initial determination of parental rights and responsibilities. A mandatory appeal provides that the case “shall be accepted by the supreme court for review on the merits.” Although an appeal from a final divorce decree or final decree on legal separation is a mandatory appeal, an initial determination of parental rights and responsibilities between unmarried parents was not.

In Miller v. Todd the Supreme Court declined to address the issue by declaring it moot. In other words, because the Supreme Court had accepted the father’s discretionary appeal for review, the issue was purely academic because he had not been harmed by having his appeal declined. The Court noted, however, that “any consideration regarding amending Rule 3 should be accomplished in accordance with the rule-making procedures set forth in Supreme Court Rule 51, thereby providing the public, the bench and the bar an opportunity to offer comments and suggestions.”

On April 4, 2014, the Supreme Court adopted new rules, including an amendment to Supreme Court Rule 3 that now provides a mandatory appeal for “the first final order issued in, or arising out of, a domestic relations matter filed under RSA Title XLIII (RSA chapters 457 to 461-A).” The comments to the new rules identify the change results from the claim raised in Miller v. Todd that “providing for mandatory review of appeals involving married parents but discretionary review of appeals involving non-married parents raises constitutional concerns."

The Supreme Court issued In Re Deven O. on November 7, 2013.

The Facts

Deven was born in June 2006 and lived with his parents until they split up in December 2006. Deven lived with his mother and visited with his father a few days each month until December 2007, when father was arrested and incarcerated for armed robbery. Mother visited father in prison, but Deven visited just once. When father was released to a half-way house in June 2010, father visited with Deven multiple times per week over the next three months. In September 2010, mother told father that she did not want him visiting with Deven until he “straightened out his life.”

In October 2010, mother filed a petition to change Deven’s name. Although she knew father had been released from prison, she listed father’s address as the prison. Father found out about the name change in December 2010 after she posted about it online. Father contacted mother that month to arrange for Christmas gifts. In March 2011, father began to attempt to arrange for parenting time with Deven by calling mother. He also contacted mother’s father for help try to arrange visits. When these efforts failed, he filed a parenting petition in December 2011. Mother countered by filing a petition to terminate father’s parental rights.

Following a trial, the court terminated the father’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment and failure to support, and made a finding that the termination was in Deven’s best interest. 

The Appeal

The father appealed the trial court’s decision, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there were grounds to terminate his parental rights. The father also asserted that he had no legal obligation to support the child because he was not listed on the birth certificate and there was no child support order. 

The Holding

The Supreme Court held that the mother failed to sustain her heavy burden and that there was insufficient evidence to support the termination of father’s parental rights. Parental rights are a fundamental liberty interest that cannot be pushed aside because a person has not been a model parent. The Court emphasized that a finding that six months passed without communication between the parent and child is only the first step in the analysis, and the trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the presumption of abandonment has been rebutted. The Supreme Court reminded trial courts to consider whether the parent’s conduct "evidences a willingness to take on responsibility and concern for the child’s physical and emotional care and well-being." Here, although there was a six month period without contact, the evidence of father’s repeated efforts to make contact with Deven prior to his filing of a parenting petition rebutted the presumption.

The Court also considered the mother’s refusal to allow access to the child. The Court looked to its opinion in In Re Sheena B., where the court determined that there could be no abandonment where the separation between a parent and child was caused solely by the other parent. Thus, the Court held, when considering the father’s efforts to see Deven and the mother’s refusal to allow the contact, that there was “insufficient evidence to support a finding of a settled purpose to abandon the child.”

The Supreme Court notes that the statute does not define, nor has the Court addressed, what it means to be “financially able” to provide a child with necessary subsistence, education or other care as RSA 170-C:5,II. However, here, the Court did not need to address this issue because it found that the evidence was insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that father was financially able but failed to support Deven.

The Takeaway

Deven O. was third in a string of termination of parental rights cases the New Hampshire Supreme Court issued opinions on in 2013. See In re Sophia-Marie H. & In re Faith T. All were private terminations where a parent or guardian sought termination of the rights of a parent (as opposed to DCYF initiated case). In each case, the Supreme Court emphasized that parental rights are “natural, essential, and inherent” within the meaning of the Constitution of New Hampshire and refused to terminate parental rights. Parental rights cannot be ignored because a person has not been an ideal parent.  These three cases act as a large neon caution sign for trial courts in termination proceedings.

After a final order of child support is entered, either party may seek a modification at any time based on a substantial change in circumstances that has made the original order unfair and improper. A party may also seek a modification if more than three years has passed since the date of the final order without a need to show a substantial change in circumstances.  

Cases are always fact specific, and your situation may be different then the examples laid out here. Situations vary by income, expenses, new children and stepchildren, distance between the homes, or special needs of a child. The court hearing your case will examine the specific factual circumstances of your family to determine whether there has been a substantial change in circumstances that make the original order improper or unfair. Therefore, it is important to succinctly and accurately make your case for the modification.

Examples of situations that could warrant modification include:

  • Involuntary loss of employment.
  • Reduction or increase in income
  • Change in residential responsibility or parenting time.
  • Child graduating from high school or turning 18, while younger still children still require child support.
  • A parent returning to school. In Re Lynn.

There are several circumstances that the New Hampshire Supreme Court has ruled that modification of child support should be denied. Some of the circumstances include:

  • A parent’s relocation itself, without more evidence, is not a substantial change in circumstances sufficient to modify child support. In Re Adams.
  • The remarriage of either party does not as a matter of law warrant a modification of child support. Peterson v. Buxton.
  • Absent other circumstances, the expected growth of a child and normal cost of living increases are not substantial chances or special circumstances that justify modification. Morrill v. Millard.