Until 2012, the burden of proof to terminate a guardianship of a child was placed upon the parent to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the substitution or supplementation of parental care and supervision was no longer necessary to provide for the child’s essential physical and safety and that terminating the guardianship would not adversely impact the child’s psychological well-being. Then, the Supreme Court issued its opinion on In the Matter of Reena D.  which implemented a two-tier standard for fit and unfit parents. The above standard still applied in cases where parents had contested a guardianship and the guardianship was granted over their objection.

However, parents that consented to a guardianship had an easier path to termination of the guardianship. Parents who consented retained their status as a “fit parent” and were entitled to the Troxel v. Granville presumption that a fit parent acts in their child’s best interests. Thus, the standard for termination of a guardianship established by consent shifts the burden to the guardian to prove by clear and convincing evidence “that substitution or supplementation of parental care and supervision” is “necessary to provide for the essential physical and safety needs of the minor” and that terminating the guardianship will “adversely affect the minor’s psychological well-being.” The New Hampshire Supreme Court juxtaposed this standard with a guardianship established over a parents’ objection pointing out that the Troxel presumption is overcome during the establishment of a contested guardianship.

            The New Hampshire Legislature recently updated the guardianship statute to implement a new standard for termination of a guardianship if the guardian is the grandparent of the child. Effective January 1, 2018, the statute provides that if guardianship over a child was granted to a grandparent as the result of the parent’s substance abuse or dependence, the standard for termination of the guardianship is:

the burden of proof shall be on the parent to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that substitution or supplementation of parental care and supervision is no longer necessary to provide for the essential physical and safety needs of the minor and termination of the guardianship will not adversely affect the minor’s psychological well-being.

This standard applies whether the guardianship was contested or uncontested. With this change, a fit parent who agrees to a guardianship because of the parent’s substance abuse or dependence will have the same standard for terminating the guardianship as any parent whose children are under guardianship over their objection. At first glance, this change appears ripe for constitutional challenge. The fact that a parent has a substance abuse problem does not negate their rights under Troxel. A parent with a substance problem can still have the insight to act in their child’s best interests by finding alternative care for the child while they seek treatment.  

Over the years, I have had several clients come to me with issues regarding the retroactivity of a child support modification. These situations have included circumstances such as informal modifications of child support which were never filed with the court to demands from the other parent to make a modification retroactive to the date of a substantial change, such as a child turning 18 or graduating from high school, without any pending petition to modify. There is an easy answer, which often results in a difficult situation.

A child support order cannot be modified prior to the date that the party receives notice of the petition for modification. RSA 458-C:7 defines “notice” as either service as specified in the civil account or acceptance of a copy of the petition by certified mail receipt. The trial court may, however, order modification prospectively from the date of service forward. If it takes months, or even a year, to conduct a hearing and issue an order, either party runs the risk of the modification dating back to the time of service.

There is however a small narrow exception contained in the case law. In the case of In Re Nicholson the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that due to specific language in the parties divorce decree and uniform support order the child support could be modified retroactively to the time of the substantial change in circumstances (in this case a child becoming ineligible). In this case, the child support order had specific language as follows:

Unless the court … specifies differently, the amount of a child support obligation stated in the order for support shall remain as stated in the order until all dependent children for whom support is provided in the order shall terminate their high school education or reach the age of 18 years, whichever is later, or become married, or become a member of the armed forces, at which time the child support obligation terminates without further legal action. This amount shall remain as specified unless a legal order expressly allocates the payments on a per child basis.

This language is no longer in the standard uniform support order. Now, the SO -3C reads:

The effective date of any modification shall be no earlier than the date of notice to the other party. “Notice” means either of the following: 1) service as specified in civil actions or 2) the respondent’s acceptance of a copy of the petition, as long as the petition is filed no later than 30 days following the respondent’s acceptance.

Notwithstanding the narrow exception contained in Nicholson, it is very important that any agreements to modify child support be signed and filed with the court for approval. It is likewise critical that when a substantial change occurs, the petition must be filed immediately to preserve the ability to modify child support. Without taking these steps, a party could end up owing a substantial debt in child support when the other party seeks enforcement of the order rather than the informal agreement or the obligor has sat on their right to modify and must continue to pay at the higher rate of support. 
 

“All human beings have three lives: public, private, and secret.” 
― Gabriel Garcí­a Márquez, Gabriel García Márquez: a Life

The public thirsts for gossip, apparent in websites like TMZ and Perz Hilton. Celebrity splits are big news such as Tom Cruise and Katie Holmes to Mariah Carey and Nick Cannon. While most of us do not enjoy celebrity status, the small town rumor mill can be just as virulent as celebrity gossip. Divorce litigants should beware the rules regarding public access to their divorce file. Anyone can head down to the local courthouse and view all the happenings in the neighbor’s divorce or co-worker’s custody battle.  

The prominent case on this issue is the Petition of Keene Sentinel issued by the New Hampshire Supreme Court on August 27, 1992. During the 1990 political campaign for New Hampshire’s Second congressional seat, The Keene Sentinel sought to gain access to one of the incumbent’s, Charles Douglas III’s divorce records. The clerk granted the Keene Sentinel only some of the divorce records, citing privacy concerns. The Keene Sentinel brought suit and Charles Douglas III sought to intervene, asking the Superior Court to dismiss the suit. The Superior Court ultimately denied the Keene Sentinel’s request.

The Keene Sentinel appealed, arguing that “disclosure should have been permitted pursuant to RSA chapter 91-A, the Right to Know Law.” The Supreme Court held that a party in a divorce proceeding cannot have the records sealed simply for the sake of general privacy concerns.  The Court held that “[b]efore a document is ordered sealed, the trial judge must determine that no reasonable alternative to nondisclosure exists.” If a trial judge does make such a determination, it must use the least restrictive means available to secure the parties’ privacy rights.

This generally requires that the orders, pleadings and other materials in the file are open to the public for viewing. An exception is a financial affidavit. A party is required by the court to complete and submit a sworn financial affidavit, detailing all income, property and debts. This document usually contains very personal information such as social security numbers, bank information and paystubs. Family Division Rule 2.16 and RSA 458:15-b requires financial affidavits to be confidential for non-parties. In practice, this means that the court file contains an envelope which the clerk will remove if you are not a party to the case. Financial affidavits filed in divorce, legal separation, annulment, or parenting petition cases shall be confidential to non-parties. Access to such financial affidavits shall be pursuant to Family Division Rule 1.30. However, a person not otherwise entitled to access may file a motion under Family Division Rule 1.30 to gain access to the financial affidavit. 

The Associated Press v. NH gives some context to the rule regarding financial affidavit confidentiality. The New Hampshire Supreme Court issued its holding in this case on December 30, 2005.   After RSA 458:15-b took effect on August 10, 2004, which, inter alia, made financial affidavits in divorce proceedings only accessible to parties to the proceeding and their attorneys of record, the Associated Press filed suit claiming the law was unconstitutional. The Associated Press argued that the law “violated the public’s right of access to court records” under the State Constitution, and that it was an impermissible restraint on freedom of speech per the State and Federal Constitutions.  The trial court determined that the law was not unconstitutional, and dismissed The Associated Press’ suit. The Associated Press appealed the trial court decision, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that the law was constitutional.

 The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court, and finding RSA 458:15-b constitutional. The Court ruled that although the public has a right to access government documents, including court documents, the right is not unlimited.  It opined that "the right of access may be overcome when a sufficiently compelling interest for nondisclosure is identified,” which included the compelling interest to prevent exposing divorce litigants to identify theft and fraud. The Court’s ruling was narrow, however, and only applied to keeping financial affidavits sealed. 

In general, the Court may upon request consider keeping confidential case-related materials for collateral cases that are already confidential pursuant to New Hampshire law. These include termination of parental rights, adoption, juvenile criminal records and abuse/neglect cases and DCYF records.  

 

Before the advent of the internet, finding proof of infidelity often fell to the hands of the private investigator and a telephoto camera lens. Yet, with today’s technology, from spyware to GPS trackers, spouses can play private investigator themselves. Software such as Spector Pro and E-Blaster, that captures chats, instant messages, emails, websites, keystrokes, and screen shots and are either saved to the computer or sent to a remote location, can be easily installed on home computers. GPS trackers, costing between $100 and $400, can provide incriminating information on a spouse’s whereabouts. Evidence obtained through these methods, such as graphic emails confirming an extramarital affair or a log of a spouse’s visits to a new lover’s home, can make or break a fault divorce. Additionally, the evidence may be useful for other matters in a divorce, as Jason Brown of the Minnesota Divorce & Family Law Blog points out. Attorney Brown highlights on his blog that information about who your spouse is exposing your children to can be extremely valuable in assisting the court in determining the best interests of your children. Child support and alimony cases can also benefit from information about your spouse’s employment and work patterns.

But is the evidence that you collect admissible in court? And even more importantly, is gathering information in this manner legal?

 

New Hampshire is one of 15 states to pass anti-spyware legislation. RSA 359-H criminalizes knowingly causing a computer program or spyware to be copied onto the computer, on which the person is not an authorized user, and using the program or spyware to collect personal information “through intentionally deceptive means, such as through the use of a keystroke logging function, and transferring that information from the computer to another person.” However, the statute does not provide for a blanket exclusionary rule with regard to whether this intercepted information may be used as evidence at a civil trial. Whether the evidence comes in is left to the discretion of the court.

Other states have upheld a trial court’s ruling to exclude the evidence. In Florida, a wife, using the Spector program, secretly installed the spyware on her husband’s computer and was able to capture entire conversations the husband had had with another woman. The husband discovered the program, and asked the court to prevent the wife from using the evidence. The trial court ruled, and the appellate court agreed, that although the state and federal wiretapping statute did not have an exclusionary rule, the court had the discretion to exclude the evidence because it was obtained illegally.

Whether the evidence will come before the court comes down to the facts surrounding how the evidence was obtained. Was the spyware installed before or after the separation? Was the spyware on a family computer that both spouses used or had access to? Arguably, evidence obtained from spyware installed by an “authorized user” onto a family computer prior to a separation would be admissible. However, installing spyware onto a spouse’s workplace computer would probably produce evidence that would be excluded because it was obtained illegally.

GPS trackers on the other hand are not covered by a specific law such as the wiretapping or spyware statutes. However, some law enforcement agencies have taken the position that placing a GPS tracker on a spouse or ex-spouse’s vehicle is stalking and have brought criminal charges against the tracker installer. The Nashua Police recently charged Kevin Merritt with misdemeanor stalking after he installed a GPS tracker on his estranged wife’s vehicle and used the information to follow her to various locations. Whether the police would prosecute and the court would allow the information to be used as evidence would come down to the specific facts of the case, including how the information gleaned from the tracker is used and who owns the vehicle.

In the end, the muddy waters of electronic information gathering require the advice of an experienced attorney to help navigate the specifics of your situation. Contact Crusco Law Office, PLLC to schedule an appointment to discuss your New Hampshire case.  

           

Before your final trial, the court will conduct a pretrial hearing. Learn here what will happen at the hearing and what needs to be prepared and filed at the hearing. 

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I am always surprised when a potential client comes in to meet with me and says “there’s no such thing as alimony in New Hampshire, right?” Be assured, there is alimony in New Hampshire. 

Alimony is governed by RSA 458:19. The law says that the recipient must have the need for alimony, and the payor must have the ability to pay. The alimony award must take into account the lifestyle of the parties during the marriage. In determining the amount of alimony, the court must consider the length of the marriage; the age, health, social or economic status, occupation, amount and sources of income, the property awarded to either party, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of each of the parties; the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income; the fault of either party as defined in RSA 458:16-a, II(l); and the federal tax consequences of the order.

Things to know about alimony:

  • Alimony is gender neutral. Men and women can receive alimony.
  • The court has broad discretion when awarding alimony, and there is no formula in New Hampshire for either an amount or a term.
  • Alimony cannot be waived in a divorce stipulation. The law provides either spouse with the right to petition for alimony within 5 years of the date of the divorce decree, or if alimony has been ordered for a definite time period, within 5 years from the date of the last payment.
  • Alimony is tax deductible to the payor, and is taxable income to the recipient.
  • The primary purpose of alimony is rehabilitative, meaning the support is intended to allow the recipient time to become self-supporting. However, the court has the authority to order alimony for an indefinite period of time where appropriate.
  • Agreements that contain a provision for the payment of alimony often include language about the terminating alimony upon the recipient’s remarriage or cohabitation with a romantic partner. 

New Hampshire collaborative practice employs an interdisciplinary model, which is fancy for saying that the professional team includes attorneys, a coach and a financial neutral. When the topic of hiring a coach comes up, I sometimes receive this feedback:

  • Why do we need a coach?
  • I already have a therapist, isn’t that the same thing?
  • It’s another expense in the process. 
  • Let’s see how it goes without one and we can always hire one later. 

I intended to write a thorough and thoughful post about the need for a coach, and then found this article Do You Really Need a Divorce Coach in the Collaborative Process? by Helene Taylor. I really can’t say it better myself, and it answers all the frequently asked questions. It’s a must read if you are considering a collaborative divorce. I especially love her explanation of the difference between a therapist and a divorce coach:

A therapist is someone you bring your luggage to and she helps you open it up and decipher the contents; a divorce coach is someone you bring your luggage to and, without opening it, she helps you carry it across the street.

From my attorney perspective, a coach helps me do my job better and reach the end result quicker. The coach, who is far better trained in the emotional aspects of a divorce than I am, can facilitate the emotional discussions and keep lines of communication between the parties open so that the legal discussions can be more productive.

For more information about collaborative divorce, check out the information video from the International Academy of Collaborative Professionals. You can also download a free Collaborative Divorce Knowledge Kit

Unbundled legal services, also known as limited scope representation, allow you to hire a lawyer to do certain parts of your case, instead of the traditional soup to nuts representation. Some clients choose unbundled services because they cannot afford full representation, and some advice is better than no advice. Other clients feel capable of handling certain parts of the case, but need assistance with other portions.

Unbundled services can be customized to fit your needs, and can include

  • Representation at a specific hearing, such as a temporary hearing
  • Draft proposed orders or pleadings
  • Attending mediation
  • Assisting with discovery preparations
  • Consulting during your case to provide assistance and advice  

Payment arrangements for unbundled services can be tailored to the specific service. For example, paying a small retainer for ongoing advice, or paying for an hour at the end of a meeting to prepare documents.

Lawyers providing unbundled services will ask the client to sign a consent form that clearly spells out what services are, and are not, going to be provided, in addition to a fee agreement. 

The following are the new judge and marital master assignments for family cases in the Circuit and Superior Court for January 2013 through March 2013:

 

1st Circuit


Colebrook

Hon. Paul D. Desjardins
(most of these hearings are held in Lancaster)


Berlin

To Be Determined 


Lancaster

Hon. J. Peter Cyr

2nd Circuit


Lebanon

Hon. Lawrence A. Macleod, Jr.


Littleton

Hon. J. Peter Cyr


Haverhill

Hon. J. Peter Cyr


Plymouth

Hon. Thomas A. Rappa

3rd Circuit


Conway

Hon. Pamela D. Albee


Ossipee

Hon. James R. Patten

4th Circuit


Laconia

Michael H. Garner, Marital Master

5th Circuit


Claremont

Hon. John J. Yazinski


Newport

Hon. Bruce A. Cardello

6th Circuit


Concord          

Nancy J. Geiger, Marital Master 
Henrietta W. Luneau, Marital Master
Michael H. Garner, Marital Master


Franklin

Nancy J. Geiger, Marital Master
Hon. Edward M. Gordon


Hillsborough

Hon. Edward B. Tenney


Hooksett

Hon. Paul S. Moore

7th Circuit


Dover

Robert J. Foley, Marital Master


Rochester

Hon. Susan W. Ashley
Robert J. Foley, Marital Master 


Cheshire Superior

Hon. John Kissinger 

9th Circuit


Manchester

Hon. Susan B. Carbon
Thomas G. Cooper, Marital Master
Hon. Sharon DeVries 
Bruce F. DalPra, Marital Master

Nashua

Hon. Julie A. Introcaso
Hon. Michael J. Ryan


Merrimack

Bruce F. DalPra, Marital Master
Hon. Clifford R. Kinghorn, Jr. 


Goffstown

Hon. Paul S. Moore

10th Circuit


Brentwood

Henrietta W. Luneau, Marital Master
Hon. David G. LeFrancois


Salem

Thomas G. Cooper, Marital Master


Derry

Hon. Lucinda V. Sadler


Portsmouth

Hon. Jennifer A. Lemire

 

Voters will be asked on Nov. 6 to approve an amendment to Part 2, Art. 73-a of the New Hampshire Constitution. If the amendment passes, the legislature would be given final say over how the New Hampshire Judicial Branch, an independent branch of government, operates. I oppose the amendment because it allows for a legislative takeover of the courts that violates separation of powers.

Allowing the legislature to dictate court procedures will politicize the courts. Court rules would be subject to change whenever the legislature meets and according to the influence of the political party in control, creating unpredictable and inconsistent procedures and outcomes.

The Nashua Telegraph opined on October 2, 2012 that “the proposed amendment makes a mockery of the system of checks and balances crucial to American government” Instead of an independent judiciary, “the Legislature would be the boss of the New Hampshire’s court system.”

I am voting no on question 2, and I hope that you will join me.